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6.1  Introduction 
Work on how taxes affect both capital formation and welfare has produced 
a wide variety of conclusions spanning the range from little or no effect (Har- 
berger 1964, Wright 1969), to large effects (Summers 1981), to intermediate 
(Ballard, Fullerton,  Shoven,  and  Whalley  1983, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and 
Skinner 1983 [AKS]), to random (King and Fullerton 1984). Despite, or per- 
haps because of this wide variety of conclusions, the study of tax effects on 
capital formation has been one of the most active areas of public finance re- 
search over the last ten or so years. 
In this paper, we reevaluate some of this work in light of the fact that little 
of  it explicitly considers how  tax factors enter when accumulation of both 
human and nonhuman capital occurs. We  motivate the paper by  recognizing 
the potential quantitative dominance of human relative to nonhuman capital, 
and build on a limited but still important taxation and human capital literature. 
This begins with Boskin (1975) who argues that human capital is taxed on a 
consumption tax basis and is tax preferred relative to nonhuman capital; and 
Kotlikoff and Summers (1979) (KS) who show how  interasset (humadnon- 
human) substitution effects in a growth model can change the way taxes affect 
steady-state behavior.  It also includes Driffill and Rosen  (1983) (DR) who 
analyze the effects of  taxes for a single consumer life-cycle optimization prob- 
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lem with both human and nonhuman capital. Their simulation results show 
that in a partial equilibrium setting welfare costs of  income taxes rise when 
human capital is also taken into account.' 
Our analysis departs from this work  both  in  considering a full dynamic 
model in which human and nonhuman capital substitution effects on the pro- 
duction side and trading in nonhuman assets among overlapping generations 
occur,  and in  computing transition paths following tax changes as well as 
steady states.  We  also develop clear intuition as to the ways in  which the 
presence of human capital affects tax analysis. We  stress both the sequential 
nature of asset accumulation over the life-cycle and the implications that fol- 
low for assessments of the effects of taxes on capital formation. 
Compared to models that do not separately identify human and nonhuman 
capital, there is an additional welfare cost associated with taxes on the return 
to financial assets since they not only change the time profile of consumption 
over the lifetime as in a one-asset model, but in addition affect asset accumu- 
lation decisions. The resulting welfare losses are in addition to those empha- 
sized in existing single asset work. Furthermore, taxes on the income return 
to savings affect the composition of  savings, with substitution out of nonhu- 
man capital into human capital. Therefore, two substitution margins affect 
financial savings rather than one as in a traditional life-cycle model. Savings 
in aggregate falls, in the presence of an income tax, but savings in the form of 
human capital rises. 
We use a numerical simulation model based on earlier joint work (Davies, 
Hamilton, and Whalley  1989) into which we  incorporate human capital to 
analyze how these effects interact. Human capital is incorporated into a 50- 
period lifetime, overlapping generations equilibrium structure. Simple, and 
familiar, functional forms  are used: consumers have constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility functions, and the aggregate production function is 
Cobb-Douglas. A constant elasticity human  capital production function is 
also used. The model is calibrated to a stylized data set for the U.S. economy 
in the mid-l970s, closely related to that used by Summers (1980, 1981). Sen- 
sitivity of the results to alternative parameter values is also examined. 
Our central-case results indicate that, in a dynamic one-sector economy of 
the Summers type, unlike the partial equilibrium analysis of Driffill and Ro- 
sen, incorporating human capital may not change the full dynamic welfare 
impact of alternative tax experiments markedly. For a move from an income 
to either a consumption or wage tax there is almost no change in long-run 
welfare effects from incorporating human capital. On the other hand, impact 
effects on savings are larger, and the transition to a new balanced growth path 
with endogenous human capital is more rapid since stocks of both factors can 
adjust. We  therefore find ourselves in disagreement with the partial equilib- 
rium conclusion that welfare costs of income taxes are larger with endogenous 
human capital. This conclusion is, in part, a reflection of the well-known re- 
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tax wedges tends to be eclipsed by gains due to movement toward the golden 
rule capital intensity. However, it also reflects the fact that in steady-sfafe  com- 
parisons we find that there is little distortion in the pattern of human capital 
investment. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the effects of 
taxes on human capital accumulation in a 2-period framework, and discusses 
how insights from partial equilibrium analysis need to be modified in light of 
full dynamic equilibrium analysis. Section 6.3 then lays out the formal struc- 
ture of  a multiperiod life-cycle model of  consumption, leisure, and human 
capital accumulation. The implementation of this general structure in our sim- 
ulations, which for computational simplicity endogenize human capital but 
take leisure as fixed, is explained in section 6.4. Results of the simulations  are 
presented in section 6.5. 
The conclusion to the paper emphasizes how a number of features that po- 
tentially complicate tax analysis are not captured in the simulation model pre- 
sented here.  Especially important is  the omission of  endogenous labor- 
leisure choice since there is  an important mutual interaction between labor 
supply and human capital investment plans. Also important is progressivity in 
the income tax, which for computational reasons we do not incorporate. Li- 
quidity constraints have also not been modeled, and we assume that all human 
capital reflects accumulation of general rather than job-specific training. Al- 
ternative models of the educational process, such as screening, in which edu- 
cation has only redistributive effects rather than increasing the productivity of 
workers either by enhancing their skills or producing information of value in 
job-worker matching (both of which are captured by  the human capital ap- 
proach), are not considered. Also, we have not estimated the possible effect 
of  rationing of  access to either publicly funded or prestige maximizing edu- 
cational institutions, under which tax effects on human capital formation have 
a lump-sum element. Finally, we have not examined the role of intergenera- 
tional links within the family in helping to determine patterns of human capi- 
tal formation. Our analysis is, therefore, a first foray into an area of investi- 
gation from which most public finance economists have generally kept their 
distance. Further work may therefore alter the thrust of the results presented 
here, although we believe our insights on both partial equilibrium effects and 
differences between partial and full dynamic equilibrium analysis will endure. 
6.2  Human Capital and the Analysis of Tax 'lkeatment of 
Capital Income 
Human capital is best thought of  as the accumulation of  a future income 
stream through the investment of  time to provide for higher income in the 
future. As an asset, it is different from real capital. In the absence of slavery, 
individuals cannot purchase others' human capital or sell any which they ac- 
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rate-in  the case of  additions sometimes at a fairly quick rate, but  in the 
opposite direction only at the rate of depreciation. Being individual specific, 
human capital can also not be bequeathed or given away.* 
Analyzing the ways in  which human capital affects the standard literature 
analysis of  the tax treatment of capital is complicated by the fact that human 
capital occurs in both “general” and “specific” form. General human capital 
consists of skills that are portable across firms, whereas specific human capital 
consists of skills that are only useful while working for a particular employer. 
While it is relatively easy to model the accumulation of human capital when 
all skills are general, this is not the case where skills are job-specific to some 
degree. Human capital theory merely predicts that the costs of and returns to 
investment in specific human capital (usually acquired on the job) will be 
shared between worker and employer, with the precise outcome being deter- 
mined by implicit bargaining between the 
To the extent that firms bear some of the costs of  specific training, human 
capital accumulation may also be directly affected by  business taxes, and in 
particular the corporate income tax. Under the latter, training costs are fully 
deductible and the returns to the firm fully taxable. Neglecting the imperfect 
utilization of tax losses, this means that the employer’s portion of investment 
in  specific training receives cash-flow tax  treatment at the corporate level. 
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the determinants of how employers 
and employees share the costs of specific training. The result is that the pres- 
ent study, like previous work incorporating human capital in the public finance 
literature, is mostly confined to the analysis of general human capital. 
There are also complex issues concerning the relationship between school- 
ing and screening (see, e.g., Spence 1973). In the extreme, if education rep- 
resents entirely unproductive signaling it is a wasteful activity and ought to be 
di~couraged.~  More sophisticated models, recognizing that signals may either 
represent useful skills or play a useful role in job matching, have less dracon- 
ian policy implications. However, to the extent that education represents sig- 
naling there is usually an argument that private markets generate “too much” 
education. Tax  systems that  encourage human  capital investment therefore 
appear especially inappropriate. In the remainder of  this paper, for the most 
part we put these complications on one side, treating human capital as general 
rather  than  specific  and  rejecting  the  pure  screening  interpretation  of 
schooling. 
As pointed out by Boskin (1975), in his notes on the tax treatment of human 
capital, human capital basically receives consumption tax treatment. Investors 
in human capital forgo other uses of time when investing, which is equivalent 
to forgoing gross of tax income to save in the form of human capital. Supply- 
ing labor and changing consumption between periods via human capital ac- 
cumulation, therefore, only involves single taxation as under a consumption 
tax, rather than double taxation as under an income tax. Investment in the 167  Taxes and Capital Formation 
asset is treated much like a tax shelter, with investment implicitly yielding a 
tax break. Taxes only apply to the income return to the 
In the traditional 2-period consumption diagram commonly used to show 
how taxes influence capital accumulation and savings, human capital can be 
seen to complicate the analysis and, if  anything, amplify the welfare cost of 
intertemporal tax distortions. How this occurs is shown in figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
In  figure 6.1 (the no-tax case), the individual is endowed with an "unim- 
proved' earnings stream E lying on the 45" line. By  forgoing consumption in 
period  1 (C,),  the individual can transform consumption opportunities be- 
tween periods according to the transformation frontier AD.  The curvature of 
this frontier reflects the diminishing marginal rate of return to human capital 
investment  .6 
Given the interest rate the individual faces, optimizing behavior involves 
moving from the endowment point A  to the tangency B  (which maximizes 
lifetime wealth) through human capital investment. Utility maximization im- 
plies moving from point B to consumption point C by accumulating financial 
assets in period 1 (saving) and then reselling them in period 2. Note that the 
horizontal intercept of  the  effective budget  constraint, ZZ,  gives the  dis- 
counted present value of lifetime earnings; that is, it is a measure of  human 
I 
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Fig. 6.1  'ko-period  intertemporal consumption smoothing in the no-tax case 168  James Davies and John Whalley 
wealth. It is important to distinguish the latter, which is a value, from human 
capital, which is a physical stock. 
Optimizing behavior thus implies a two-stage process. Human capital ac- 
cumulation occurs up to the point where the rate of  return on human capital 
equals the interest rate, r. Accumulation or decumulation of  financial assets 
then occurs, as needed, to smooth the modified earnings stream, B, into the 
desired consumption stream, C. Although figure 6.1 illustrates a case with 
positive saving, an outcome where positive accumulation of  human capital 
occurs in the early years of  the life-cycle, but there is net borrowing, could 
also occur.’ 
The effects of an interest income tax that applies only to the return to finan- 
cial assets in this framework are shown in figure 6.2. The budget constraint 
ZZ from figure 6.1 becomes more shallowly sloped in the presence of the tax, 
as represented by 2’2’ in  figure 6.2 This results in  more accumulation of 
human  capital  (represented by  the  movement  from  B  to  B’  for  wealth- 
maximizing human capital accumulation), smaller total savings, and consid- 
erably smaller financial savings because of the substitution effect. The inter- 
asset distortion created by  the tax yields an additional welfare cost beyond 
that recognized in existing dynamic tax analyses (i.e., the tax-induced over- 
accumulation of human capital) and acts to reduce savings as conventionally 
Z’ 
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Fig. 6.2  Wo-period intertemporal consumption smoothing in the presence of 
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measured, that is, in the form of accumulation of financial assets. This addi- 
tional effect of taxes on saving is not widely recognized in the literature. 
Diagrams of  this type can also be used to illustrate the impact of wage or 
consumption taxes (see Davies and St-Hilaire 1987, 77-82).  Either a propor- 
tional wage or consumption tax will radially shift the earnings transformation 
frontier, AD, inward. Although savings in the form of nonhuman capital will 
be reduced, the optimal human capital investment plan will be unchanged, 
and if revenues are returned to the individual via lump-sum transfers, the bud- 
get constraint will revert to its pretax position, ZZ. Savings in nonhuman form 
may, however, still differ from their pretax value if the transfer payments alter 
the timing of income receipts over the lifetime. A proportional wage tax used 
to finance social security payments in the second period, for example, would 
leave human capital investment unchanged but would reduce private saving. 
Progressivity of either wage or consumption taxes would  also alter this 
simple picture. With smoothly increasing marginal tax rates under a wage tax, 
the slope of the AD locus in figure 6.1 would be lower in absolute value at all 
points (except A). The result would be  reduced human capital investment. 
Human capital investment would also be distorted somewhat under a simple 
progressive annual expenditure tax, but there would be no distortion under a 
Blueprints-style  lifetime consumption tax (see again Davies and St.  -Hilaire 
Note that if  human capital is considerably larger in value terms than real 
capital, as many believe, and if  there is significant substitution between the 
two, then in percentage terms, the differential impact of taxes on savings from 
either including or not including human capital in the analysis will be corre- 
spondingly larger.8  Also, as one moves outside of the partial equilibrium anal- 
ysis represented by  figures 6.1 and 6.2, one might expect that the rate of 
return on the smaller real capital stock from the production side of the econ- 
omy would be largely dictated by the rate of return on the larger human capital 
stock. Thus, the rate of return on real capital might be dictated largely by the 
rate of return on human capital, and changes in the tax treatment of financial 
assets would have relatively little impact on its own net of tax rate of return 
since human capital is the dominant factor of production. In a dynamic con- 
text, if the elasticity of substitution in production between human and nonhu- 
man capital were high and intertemporal consumption elasticities were small, 
then changes in the tax treatment of real capital would largely affect the com- 
position of wealth rather than its size. Thus, arguments that current tax treat- 
ment of real capital substantially increases consumption and reduces capital 
accumulation need revision once endogeneity of gross of tax rates of return on 
real assets is included. 
As we stress above, despite the various effects of income taxes on intertem- 
poral behavior and resource allocation in the presence of human capital, there 
has been relatively little work analyzing them. Kotlikoff and Summers (1979) 
(KS) and Driffill and Rosen (1983) (DR) have made the most important con- 
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tributions. KS analyze steady-state tax incidence in an overlapping genera- 
tions growth model with a schooling choice for young people and a labor- 
leisure (i.e., “retirement”) choice for old people. They show that capital in- 
come taxes are partly shifted onto labor by induced increases in human capital 
accumulation. On the other hand,  if  wage taxes reduce labor supply (i.e., 
induce earlier retirement), they are partly shifted onto capital since labor sup- 
ply declines and the capital stock increases as a result of increased saving for 
the now-longer retirement period. KS do not analyze the welfare costs of al- 
ternative taxes. Our paper extends their work by  moving beyond steady-state 
comparisons to include the transition between steady states, by using a multi- 
period framework, and by using specific functional forms to simulate both tax 
incidence and welfare costs in a growth model incorporating human capital. 
DR explicitly investigate the welfare effects of  capital income taxes with 
endogenous leisure choice and human capital formation, but in a partial equi- 
librium single consumer setting. They use the continuous-time human capital 
life-cycle analysis of Blinder and Weiss (1  976) but utilize specific functional 
forms. Several points emerge from their work. Proportional income taxes in- 
crease human capital accumulation. An increase in income taxes reduces net 
of tax earnings, which reduces consumption of leisure and increases time de- 
voted to training. Also,  an income tax reduces the net of  tax  interest rate, 
which increases human capital accumulation. Their results suggest that the 
excess burden of income taxes is lower if human capital formation is (incor- 
rectly) treated as exogenous. A failure to explicitly model human capital ac- 
cumulation decisions leads to an overestimate of  tax revenues because in- 
creased human capital investment implies a smaller income tax base. DR also 
find that consumption taxes have a lower excess burden than proportional in- 
come taxes, and a failure to take human capital explicitly into account down- 
ward  biases estimates of efficiency gains from moving from an income to a 
consumption tax. 
Ideally, analyses of the tax treatment of human capital should also take into 
account progressivity in the income tax and the effects of  public subsidies 
covering the direct costs of formal education. Individuals typically invest in 
human capital in years in which they are in low marginal brackets but generate 
a higher return to labor in years when they are in higher brackets. Although 
such progressivity effects have been substantially weakened by recent tax re- 
forms in the United States and elsewhere, they nonetheless ought to discour- 
age human capital formation. One cannot be sure whether the result of adding 
more “realism” would be to show that taxes and transfers are less encouraging 
to human capital formation than the proportional tax analysis would suggest, 
however, since there are very heavy public subsidies to educational institu- 
tions.IO  These likely imply a rate of subsidy to the direct costs of formal edu- 
cation exceeding significantly the relevant marginal tax rate for young people. 
The extent to which such subsidies offset the discouraging effect of progres- 
sivity in the tax system is unclear. 171  Taxes and Capital Formation 
All the above analysis is, however, dependent both on partial equilibrium 
assumptions and, implicitly, the assumed perfect substitution between human 
and physical capital in production. The questions we address are how signifi- 
cant all these effects are in dynamic general equilibrium. How large are the 
additional welfare costs of tax distortions of savings when we move to a more 
standard formulation with  imperfect substitution of  factors in  production? 
How  much do induced changes in  the rental rate on human and nonhuman 
capital tend to dampen behavioral responses? How  serious a problem is the 
mismeasurement of the effects of taxes on savings? 
6.3  A Life-Cycle Growth Model with Endogenous Human 
Capital Formation 
The model we use to investigate the effects of incorporating human capital 
into analysis of taxes on capital formation is an extension of the overlapping 
generations life-cycle  simulation  models  that,  following  Summers (  1980, 
1981) and Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983) (AKS), are now  widely 
used  in the literature. In order to achieve comparability across models we 
adopt the same structure as Summers, even to the point of  largely using the 
same set of base parameters in model simulations. We  simulate the effects of 
various tax changes, and present both transitional and steady-state results. As 
in Summers (1980), for simplicity we assume myopic expectations along the 
transitional path.  We  differ in allowing endogenous investment in (general) 
human capital. 
In this section we set out the structure of  the now-standard model of  con- 
sumption, leisure and human capital choice for an isolated individual, and 
indicate how it would,  ideally, be embedded in a life-cycle growth model. 
This allows us to discuss some of the theoretical background behind the con- 
sequences of alternative taxes for capital formation and welfare that are cap- 
tured in the simulations reported later, as well as effects that are not possible 
in  our fixed-leisure simulations. The approach we  describe can be used  in 
alternative variants in which human capital and/or leisure can be fixed. Human 
capital fixed but leisure variable is the AKS case; in Summers's case both are 
fixed. Our numerical simulations reported in section 6.5 are only for the fixed- 
leisure case, since this is the simplest to compute. 
6.3.1  Life-Cycle Optimizing Behavior 
maximize an intertemporal utility function: 
In a more general model with leisure endogenous, individuals each seek to 
where C, and e, represent consumption and the fraction of  time spent in lei- 
sure in period t, respectively." Without taxes, the lifetime budget constraint is 
given by: 172  James Davies and John Whalley 
where E,  is earned income in year t, and r is the interest rate. Each household 
assumes r is time invariant (under the assumed myopic expectations) and, 
additionally, implicitly assumes that the price of consumption goods does not 
change over time. In order to introduce taxes, let E,  be net of wage or income 
taxes, replace r by  the net of  tax interest rate r,, allow a proportional con- 
sumption tax at rate u, and assume revenues are redistributed as lump-sum 
transfers R, . The budget constraint then becomes: 
Earnings are proportional to the stock of  human capital, H,, and the time 
available for earning: 
(3)  E, = W:H,  (1-S,  -  4,)  t  = 1,.  . . ,T, 
where W;  is the net of tax rental rate on human capital in period t, and s,  is 
the proportion of time spent in human capital accumulation via schooling or 
on-the-job training. Here H, is the (depreciated) sum of endowed human cap- 
ital, HI,  and all additions to the human capital stock made in the past, h,: 
IHI  t=  1 
where 6 is the depreciation rate. For convenience, we assume 6 to be constant 
over time. 
To  understand how  life-cycle optimizing behavior operates in this frame- 
work, it is helpful to first consider how any household would solve the above 
problem if the time path of e, were fixed at the optimal level 47, since if 4, is 
fixed, the human  capital investment problem and  the intertemporal utility 
maximizing problem decompose. 
With fixed leisure, optimal human capital investment is simply that which 
maximizes the value of lifetime earnings. Given optimal human capital in- 
vestment, the individual then maximizes U(C,,  . . . ,  C,; k':,  . . . ,  k':)  sub- 
ject to (2)  where the E,s  are now fixed, that is, finding the optimal consump- 
tion path reduces to a familiar (and simple) problem. 
Neglecting the possibility of comer solutions, and taking the special case 
where,  for  simplicity,  H, does  not  affect  h,, the  solution to  the  wealth- 
maximizing human capital investment problem is characterized by  the first- 
order conditions: 173  Taxes and Capital Formation 
which imply that the marginal benefit of spending additional time in schooling 
(the left-hand side) must equal forgone earnings (the wage rate, WyH,)  at each 
time t. 
In equation (5)  depreciation plays the same analytical role as r,; that is, both 
affect the discounted present value of the returns to human capital investment 
in the same way. Also, we can see that by reducing r,, interest income taxes 
raise the (private) marginal benefit of human capital investment and thereby 
distort human capital investment decisions (see Heckman 1976, S27). We also 
note that a proportional wage tax would have no effect on human capital in- 
vestment in the absence of any change in the optimal [,, since equal propor- 
tional changes in the values of  W;  leave (5)  unchanged. Heavier wage taxes 
later in life under a progressive tax reduce investment in human capital, how- 
ever, since they lower W;  early in life less than later in life in the left-hand 
side of (5). 
The wealth-maximizing human capital investment plan tends to produce 
large but falling investment in human capital in early years. At  some point 
before retirement (or the end of the life if there is not a fixed retirement age), 
human capital reaches a peak, where gross investment in human capital has 
declined to annual depreciation. Beyond this peak there is a decline in the 
human capital stock, but despite the fact that there is no scrap value, the stock 
typically remains large at the retirement point since decumulation is limited 
by  the rate of  depreciation. (This typical pattern appears in our simulation 
results discussed below.) 
The age profile of  earnings produced by  this optimal human capital plan 
differs considerably from that assumed in some previous work in the public 
finance literature. Summers (1980, 1981), for example, has all workers paid 
the same amount at a particular date, irrespective of age. The only reason for 
earnings growth over the life-cycle is that there is labor-augmenting technical 
progress. In contrast, earnings growth due to human capital investment gen- 
erates a concave age profile of earnings. Given a particular age profile of de- 
sired consumption,  and holding the present value of  lifetime earnings con- 
stant, such a concave profile is less conducive to saving in early years and just 
before retirement. Aggregate saving will therefore generally differ between 
models where wage growth is generated solely by technical progress and those 
where human capital investment enters. 
Changes in taxation may alter the age profile of earnings due to induced 
changes in human capital investment. An  interest income tax, for example, 
encourages human capital investment and makes the age profile of  earnings 
steeper. Holding the consumption profile constant, this tends to reduce saving 
in nonhuman form.'* 
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model, assume that the human capital investment plan has been fixed on an 
initially optimal path, H:,  , . . ,  H,*. Associated with H:,  . . . ,  H,* are opti- 
mal values of  s:,  . . .  S:,  which we will also treat as fixed for the moment. 
Given these, one can maximize (1) subject to (2'), where the E,s are given 
by: 
(3')  El = Wy H,* (1 -  S;  - t,) t = 1, . . . ,  T. 
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions are given by: 
where U,, and U,, indicate partials with respect to consumption and leisure 
respectively in year t. If the optimal solution for any period were that e, = 1 
for that period, (6b) would become the inequality: 
(7) 
The first-order conditions yield the followii  set of relationships: 
t=  1, ...,  T. 
Here  (7i)  indicates that  the  marginal rate  of  substitution (MRS) between 
goods and leisure in any period equals the net wage rate deflated by the rate of 
consumption taxation. The Euler relationship, (7ii), indicates that the mar- 
ginal utility of consumption must decline at a rate equal to r,, and (7iii) indi- 
cates that the MRS between leisure in different time periods is related to rn  in 
the same way as the MRS for consumption, except that changes in the wage 
rate alter the opportunity cost of  leisure as well and need to be taken into 
account. 
In general, the greater the amount of leisure taken over the lifetime, the less 
is the inducement to human capital accumulation, as can be seen in (5). Thus 
in models like KS, where both leisure and human capital are endogenous, 
taxes that tend to reduce labor supply are likely to also reduce investment in 
human capital, producing a second-round decline in the effective supply of 
labor. The age profile of  earnings becomes less steep, leading to increased 175  Taxes and Capital Formation 
saving. Thus there is a tendency for the capital-labor ratio to rise a fortiori, so 
that, for example, a wage tax may end up largely shifted onto capital (see KS). 
On the other hand, from (6) and (7) human capital investment has a major 
impact on the time path of  leisure, via its influence on the wage rate. Thus, 
features of the tax or education systems that encourage human capital invest- 
ment, such as interest income taxes or subsidies to higher education, produce 
substitution away from leisure toward consumption of goods, as well as lei- 
sure substitution between periods to the extent that the age profile of net wage 
rates is altered. By making the age profile of earnings steeper, they also lead 
to reduced saving. 
There are also potentially important interactions between leisure and con- 
sumption of  goods. Taking the household production view,  home time and 
goods may be regarded as inputs in a home production function, where the 
output is a bundle of commodities. A rising price of time (i.e., a higher wage 
rate) leads to substitution in household production away from time toward 
goods within a period (7i), but also to substitution away from consumption of 
commodities in periods when they are made relatively more expensive by the 
higher wage (7iii). It appears that the latter influence tends to dominate, since 
it is widely observed that both expenditures on goods and wage rates are hump 
shaped over the life-cycle, but leisure time has a U-shaped profile. 
The simulation model, whose results are reported later in this paper, has so 
far only been implemented with exogenous leisure. One implication is that we 
are unfortunately not able to examine computationally the consequences of 
the interaction between tax effects on labor supply and human capital invest- 
ment, some of which we have outlined above. In addition, with CRRA pref- 
erences the  model generates constant proportional desired growth of  con- 
sumption over the lifetime, which differs both from the observed pattern, and 
what would be expected on the basis of the full model sketched above. Given 
a particular age profile of earnings, quite a different pattern of savings is likely 
to be generated. Also, tax experiments can only affect the level of  the con- 
sumption profile and not its shape, so that, for example, the rich consequences 
of interactions between goods and leisure cannot be captured. 
6.3.2  The Production Side and the Aggregate Economy 
As in Summers (1981) and AKS (1983) we assume a constant rate of sub- 
stitution (CRS) aggregate production function that produces a single commod- 
ity that can be used for either consumption or capital accumulation. However, 
inputs are no longer labor and capital, but instead are human and physical 
capital: 
Y, = F(H?, K,). 
Note that the stock of human capital employed in production, H;,  is only part 
of  the overall stock, H,,  since the latter can also be employed in leisure or 
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Aggregate use of these factors in any period must equal the economy’s en- 
dowment, K,  and  I?,.  In the  simple case of  constant population the latter 
evolve according to the equations of  motion: 
where K; and H{ represent the physical and human capital held by  the genera- 
tion of age j in period r. For each of the 50 overlapping generations identified 
in the model, if (K; -  K!:;)  is positive, generationj is a saver in period t, if 
negative a dissaver. The-term H; -  H;:; is bounded from below since dis- 
saving in any period can only occur through depreciation. We  define KP  = 
HP  = K+l = 0.  K:+‘ = 0 is a consequence of  nonsatiation in a life-cycle 
context. 
The full employment conditions in this economy are somewhat more com- 
plex than in one-asset growth models, since time can be devoted to two non- 
market uses (schooling and leisure). Effective units of human capital available 
to the labor market are 
T 
where the j superscript again indicates the values for members of the various 
age groups. Full employment conditions are thus 
We  allow technical progress at rate g, and population grows at rate n. Thus, 
in a steady-state solution the rental rate on human capital will be constant, but 
aggregate stocks will grow at rate (n  + g). 
In equilibrium, a zero-profit condition for the aggregate production func- 
tion must be satisfied: 
(12)  Y, = W,Hr + r,K,, 
where Y,  is aggregate output, and W,  and r, are gross of tax rates of return to 
human  and nonhuman capital.  Output is the numeraire. An  equilibrium in 
period t,  finally, is given by values of the rental rates W,  and r, ,  such that (1 1) 
and (12) are satisfied. Furthermore if 
(13)  w,,, = (l+g)W,; I,+l = r,, 177  Taxes and Capital Formation 
then such an equilibrium lies on  a balanced growth path.I3 Revenues raised 
through taxes are redistributed in lump-sum form to each of the 50 generations 
paying taxes. 
6.4  Implementing the Model Approach 
In order to use the structure outlined above for capital income tax simula- 
tion analysis, we have made some simplifying assumptions and have chosen 
specific functional forms. As explained earlier, in the simulations reported in 
this paper we have ignored leisure. Like Summers (1981) we assume that all 
individuals work for 40 years and retire for 10. The first 40 years of the life- 
time can be used for earning or learning. The extra leisure in retirement is not 
assumed to affect utility. Using the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
utility function we therefore have the simple (and familiar) preferences: 
1 
where a  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, u. With 
this choice (7) reduces to: 
(7‘)  t  = 1,.  . . ,T,  _- 
so that C,  simply grows at a constant proportional rate that rises with r,,, and 
falls with p and a.  I4 
The choice of a human capital investment function, h, ,  is also critical in the 
model. In general h, would depend on the inputs s,  and H,  : 
(14) 
However, important special cases are provided by 
(14’)  h, = h(s,), 
h, = h (s,,  H,). 
and 
(  14”)  h,  = h (s,H,). 
The latter formulation embodies the “neutrality” hypothesis of  Ben-Porath 
(  1967).15  On the other hand, (14’) provides the computationally helpful sim- 
plification of making dh,lds,  independent of H,  . In  the simulations reported 
here we use the constant elasticity form: 
(15)  h,  = As:. 
Although constant elasticity is typically assumed in the empirical literature on 
the human capital production function,I6  (15) is, of course, a simplified for- 
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Although available empirical evidence is limited (see, e.g., Heckman 1975; 
and Haley 1976), there are strong a priori grounds for expecting the stock of 
general human capital to enter the human capital production function. It has 
been suggested, for example, that learning skills are likely one of  the most 
important forms of  general human capital. If  H, enters (14), tax effects on 
human capital investment will compound through time. Despite the absence 
of such compounding, (15) turns out to produce realistic age profiles of train- 
ing time, human capital, and earnings, as discussed in the next section. The 
partial equilibrium impact of  tax changes on human capital investment also 
turn out to be large, so that the absence of compounding in (15) does not lead 
to insensitivity of s, with respect to taxes. 
Finally, on the production side we use the Cobb-Douglas production func- 
tion: 
(16)  Y, = H;’K:-Y. 
6.4.1  Parameterization 
To  implement the model approach described above, we  choose particular 
values for the parameters appearing in all the functions given above by cali- 
brating the model to a base-case balanced growth path. This growth path is 
much the same as used by Summers (1981), and, by extension, Davies, Ham- 
ilton, and Whalley (1989). 
The basic parameter set is displayed in table 6.1, where taste, technology, 
and tax parameters are reported. Following Summers, we use a unitary inter- 
temporal elasticity of  substitution, (T,  and rate of  time preference, p  = .03. 
While our share parameter of  labor in the aggregate production function, y, 
and population growth rate, n, are also set at Summers’s values (.75 and .015, 
respectively), we have used a lower productivity growth rate, g (.Ol). Sum- 
Table 6.1  Base-Case Parameter Values 
Parameter  Value 
Tastes: 
Intertemporal elasticity of  substitution 
Rate of time preference 
Share parameter of labor in produc- 
Human capital production function: 
Technology: 
tion function 
Population growth rate 
Productivity growth rate 
Taxes: 
Capital income tax 
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mers used g = .02, but we found that we could not calibrate the human capital 
production function successfully unless a lower value was chosen for g. 
Our calibration of  the human capital production function proceeds as fol- 
lows. First, we choose arbitrary values of 6 and 8. Next we iterate until we 
find a value of the scale parameter, A, in the human capital production func- 
tion  which produces a steady state with the base-case parameter values in 
which the ratio of rental rates, rIw, and the capital-labor ratio, K/Hm,  are the 
same as in  the one-commodity version of  Davies, Hamilton, and Whalley 
(1989), which is similar to Summers’s base case. Thus the human capital pro- 
duction function is calibrated by  requiring that the rental rates and capital- 
labor ratio should be the same in the base case as in previous work, which 
ignores human capital. Finally, we look at the age profiles of  human capital, 
training time, and earnings produced by  the model in order to confirm that 
these are realistic. In principle, if  the profiles were not  realistic we would 
experiment with alternative values of 6 and 8 until they were. However, our 
initial choice, 6 = .01 and 8 = .5, proved satisfactory and further rounds of 
the process were unnecessary.  l8 
The age profiles of human capital, training time, and earnings produced by 
the model are shown in  figures 6.3 and 6.4.  Figure 6.3 indicates that new 
labor-market entrants (aged, say, 20 biologically) spend about 32% of their 
time in  human capital investment. This fraction declines at  a falling rate. 
About halfway through the working lifetime only about 10% of available time 
is being spent in training. (This pattern is fairly similar to that estimated, e.g., 
by Heckman 1975.) The age profiles of both human capital and earnings dis- 
play a shape that is familiar from both the theoretical and empirical human 
capital literature going back at least to Mincer (1974) (see also Weiss 1986, 
and Willis 1986). 
Labor and capital income tax rates in the base case are set at 20% and 50%, 
respectively, as in  Summers (1980,  1981). Following the methodology of 
Shoven and Whalley (1973), and unlike Summers, the revenues collected are 
returned to the taxpayers as lump-sum transfers. For simplicity the distribu- 
tion scheme is assumed to be uniform and unrelated to age.  l9 
The tax experiments we perform involve replacing initial taxes by wage and 
consumption taxes alternatively. The government’s revenue requirement, and 
therefore transfer payments, are maintained on a period-by-period basis in all 
experiments. Tax rates adjust to yield the required revenue, with a balanced 
budget in every period. 
In order to perform tax replacement experiments, we need to specify how 
expectations of future prices, tax rates, and transfer payments are formed. 
Like Summers (1980), we have adopted the computationally simple assump- 
tion of myopic expectations. Everyone expects that the current period rental 
and  tax  rates and  transfer payments  will  continue unchanged indefinitely. 
(Note that for transfer payments, this myopic expectation always turns out to 180  James Davies and John Whalley 
















Fig. 6.3  Human capital accumulation (H)  and training time (s) in base-case 
steady state 
have been correct.) This assumption contrasts with the perfect foresight ap- 
proach used, for example, by AKS and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983, 1987). 
The main effect of using myopic expectations in the simulations  performed 
here is that the economy converges more rapidly to the new steady state than 
with perfect foresight. This is because when capital income taxes are reduced, 
households do not anticipate that the gross rate of return on capital will de- 
cline in the future. Not  surprisingly, the capital stock converges to its new, 
higher, steady-state level more rapidly than it would if households could fore- 
see perfectly the declining gross rate of return. 
There is  some evidence on the quantitative significance of  using myopic 
expectations for results from models such as we use. In their simulations of 
capital income tax reforms, based on a model similar to Summers’s, but with 
perfect foresight, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) find that the capital stock 
has adjusted halfway to its new steady-state level between  10 and  15 years 
after the policy change. In contrast, we find here that the same degree of  con- 181  Taxes and Capital Formation 
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Fig. 6.4  Earnings (E),  transfer payments, and consumption over the life-cycle 
in the base case 
vergence has occurred after just five or six years. The latter result is similar to 
the findings of Summers (1980). 
Our  simulations thus yield base-case balanced  growth  scenarios for the 
economy and alternative time paths of behavior under changed policies. This 
allows for full welfare comparisons between base and revise cases, including 
both transitional as well as long-run effects. 
6.5  Results 
We  have used the model described in the previous sections in two alterna- 
tive modes, which we  then use to evaluate the effects of  alternative capital 
income tax changes. One is a move to a wage tax, in which the tax on interest 
income is removed and labor tax rates are revised upward to preserve reve- 
nues. The other is a move to a consumption tax, in which taxes on both labor 
income and interest income are set equal to zero and replaced by  an equal- 
yield sales tax. As in Summers, yield equality applies on a period-by-period 
basis. The two alternative model analyses have human capital endogenously 182  James Davies and John Whalley 
determined in one and exogenous in the other (effectively, the Summers case 
of labor growth at rate n). In both cases, an endogenous labor-leisure choice 
is excluded from the modeling framework for reasons of simplicity. 
In table 6.2 we report results from comparisons of sequences of equilibria 
under a move from an income tax to a wage tax and a move from an income 
tax to a consumption tax. Most of the results describe the change between the 
base and the new steady states achieved under wage and consumption taxes. 
For example,  we  report the steady-state welfare gains, with human capital 
alternatively assumed endogenous and exogenous, in the second line of both 
panels A and B (for wage and consumption taxes, respectively). The most 
striking aspect  of  these  steady-state welfare gains,  as  of  the  steady-state 
changes in capital intensity, rate of return, per capita consumption, and human 
capital stock, is the similarity of results whether human capital is endogenous 
or exogenous. Under the wage tax, steady-state welfare rises a little less when 
human capital is endogenous, apparently due to the operation of Summers’s 
postponement effect.20 
While steady-state characteristics are of  interest, more important are the 
full dynamic welfare gains shown in the first line of  each part of table 6.2. 
These capture the impact effects, the effects along a transitional path to a new 
balanced growth path, and comparisons across balanced growth paths. Wel- 
fare effects are reported in terms of the discounted present value of the period- 
by-period change in consumption plus the change in the value of the terminal 
Table 6.2  Equilibrium Sequence Comparisons for Capital Income Tax Changes 
Changes Relative to Base Case (%) 
Human Capital  Human Capital 
Endogenous  Exogenous 
A. Wage Tax: 
Present value of  consumption  5.2  5.7 
and terminal capital stock 
Welfare  5.  I  5.3 
KIHm  92.2  87.9 
r  -  38.7  -  37.7 
Consumption  11.7  12.6 
Steady state: 
Human capital stock  -3.2  .o 
B. Consumption tax: 
Present value of  consumption  6.2 
Steady state: 
and terminal capital stock 
Welfare  9.8 
KIHm  111.7 
r  -45.0 
Consumption  14.0 
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capital stock.  Adding transitional effects reduces the gains under the con- 
sumption tax, reflecting the considerable losses of the old in the early transi- 
tion years previously identified, for example,  by  AKS. In addition, transi- 
tional  welfare  changes  are  slightly  more  favorable  with  human  capital 
exogenous under both tax experiments.*' 
These results are very different than those obtained using partial equilib- 
rium assumptions by  Driffill and Rosen (1983) (DR). However, they are not 
inconsistent with the DR  results. The partial equilibrium welfare gains from 
either the wage  or consumption tax  experiment here,  as  measured by  the 
equivalent variation (EV), are 4.4%  greater here when human capital is made 
endogenous.22  (Gains are the same under wage and consumption taxes since 
they  are  equivalent in  the  partial  equilibrium context.) This  difference is 
smaller than obtained by DR with their quite different functional forms, but it 
is still substantial-in  fact, of the same order of magnitude as the full dynamic 
welfare gains in our model. Alternative parameterizations increase the partial 
equilibrium differential markedly without altering the conclusion suggested 
by the full dynamic results. For example, in the 8 = .75 run reported in table 
6.5 partial equilibrium gains are 9.1% higher when human capital is made 
endogenous, but the full dynamic welfare gains are again little affected. 
The reason for these results can be seen from tables 6.3  and 6.4.  The impact 
effect under either change in tax treatment is to increase savings, as predicted 
by  traditional analysis. In  long-run dynamic equilibrium, with a move to a 
new balanced growth path, the rate of return on nonhuman capital reverts to 
approximately its original net of tax value in both experiments. Thus, with a 
50% tax rate on capital income, a 10.6%  gross of tax rate of return, r, in the 
original base case implies a net of tax value of 5.3%,  which is not too much 
lower than the new long-run balanced growth values of 6.5%  and 6.0%  in the 
wage and consumption tax case, respectively (with endogenous human capi- 
tal). In long-run balanced  growth the net  of  tax  rate of  return on assets is 
largely unchanged,  and there is, therefore, little long-run effect on human 
capital formation. 
Thus, the effects which results by DR highlight, from including human cap- 
ital in tax analysis of  saving behavior, including the interasset substitution 
effect between human and nonhuman capital and the larger effect on savings 
that we describe in the earlier part of  this paper, turn out to be transitional 
rather than long-run effects. Also, in the long run the impacts on welfare are 
largely unchanged. 
The feature that the gross of tax rate of return on nonhuman capital falls to 
approximately the net of tax rate of return in the new balanced growth path is 
a property common to both our model and the Summers (1981) model with- 
out endogenous human capital, which uses a similar parameterization. The 
similarity of outcomes is hardly an accident. We  have calibrated our human 
capital production function to produce an optimal age-earnings profile in the 
base case that will generate aggregate saving equal to that obtained with the 184  James Davies and John Whalley 
Table 6.3  ’lkansitional Effects of a Move from an Income Tax to a Wage Tax 
A. Human capital endogenous: 
0  3.140 
1  2.887 
2  3.357 
3  3.779 
4  4.150 
5  4.471 
10  5.512 
20  6.162 
50  5.988 
100  6.035 
B. Human capital exogenous: 
0  3.140 
1  3.140 
2  3.492 
3  3.808 
4  4.088 
5  4.338 
10  5.219 
20  5.954 
50  5.857 
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Note: In part A, it takes six years for K/Hm  to converge halfway to its new steady-state value. 
The comparable figure for part B is 7 years. CIC,,  = ratio of  aggzgte consumption to that 
which would be observed if the base case had continued undisturbed. HIH,,  = ratio of aggregate 
human capital stock to that which would be observed if the base case had continued undisturbed. 
SIY  = ratio of aggregate savings (i.e,, in physical capital) to national income. 
Summers-type  exponential  age-earnings  profile.  Suppose  that  in  the 
Summers-type model the steady-state gross of tax rate of return fell exactly to 
the base-case net rate of return under either the wage or consumption tax ex- 
periment. Would  we  expect a similar drop in the steady-state gross rate of 
return in our model? The same drop in the gross rate of return would give a 
human capital investment plan under the wage or consumption tax exactly the 
same as in the base case. The shape of the steady-state age-earnings profile 
would not be affected by the tax regime. Now, would such an unchanged age- 
earnings profile allow the same capital deepening and, therefore, the same 
change in rate of  return as simulated by  Summers? If  so, our wage or con- 
sumption tax steady-states would feature the gross rate of return falling to the 
net. Given that our age-earnings profile has been chosen to giv? a base-case 
saving pattern similar to that in the Summers model, it would not be surprising 
if  it also gave a saving pattern similar to the Summers model under the wage 
or consumption taxes. Thus, the fact that in our model wage and consumption 
tax experiments produce similar capital deepening, and a similar drop in the 
gross rate of return as in Summers’ model, is not unintuitive. 185  Taxes and Capital Formation 
Table 6.4  'kansitional Effects of a Move from an Income Tax to a 
Consumption Tax 
A. Human capital endogenous: 
0  3.140 
1  2.887 
2  3.567 
3  4.157 
4  4.663 
5  5.090 
10  6.366 
20  6.885 
50  6.598 
100  6.646 
B. Human capital exogenous: 
0  3.140 
1  3.140 
2  3.677 
3  4.146 
4  4.553 
5  4.904 
10  6.055 
20  6.739 
50  6.463 

















































































Note: CIC,  = ratio of aggrsge  consumption to that which would be observed if the base case 
had continued undisturbed. HIHBc = ratio of  aggregate human capital stock to that which would 
be observed if the base case had continued undisturbed. SIY  = ratio of  aggregate savings (i.e., 
in physical capital) to national income. 
Thus, the result here that the new  steady-state human capital investment 
plan is not much different from the initial plan under the income tax reflects 
those aspects of a Summers-type  model that make savings increase sufficiently 
under wage or consumption tax experiments to bring the steady-state gross of 
tax rate of return down to about its initial net-of-tax value. There are no doubt 
many  alternative models  in  which  savings would  be  less sensitive to  tax 
changes, with the result that the gross of  tax rate of  return would not fall to 
the net, and effects on human capital investment would persist in steady state. 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide more details on the transitional paths for the 
human capital endogenous and exogenous models under the two alternative 
tax changes. They suggest a more rapid transitional process when human cap- 
ital is endogenous. In  both wage tax and consumption tax experiments, the 
short-run stimulus to saving in nonhuman form is larger when human capital 
is endogenous. Savings ratios in the impact year are .333  and .476 in the wage 
and consumption tax experiments with human capita1 exogenous, but are .382 
and .531 when human capital is endogenous. This reflects a very substantial 
accompanying decline in  human capital investment, which shows up  in  a 186  James Davies and John Whalley 
0.7% depletion of  the human capital stock after just one year under both of 
the new  tax regimes.23  The result of  the larger savings response is that the 
capital-labor ratio converges much closer to its new long-run value after five 
years when human capital is endogenous than when it is exogenous. 
Intercohort redistributive effects follow a familiar pattern in our simula- 
tions. As in AKS, under the wage tax the most substantial gains go to those 
who are old in the impact year, and under the consumption tax the reverse is 
true. These redistributive effects show only a small amount of  sensitivity to 
the endogeneity of  human capital. The largest effect is in the wage tax case 
where those aged 40 and above experience welfare gains up to 0.7% more 
when human capital is endogenous, and younger cohorts experience up to 
0.7% smaller gains. The additional benefit for older workers and retirees can 
be traced to the slower decline of the interest rate in the initial years of transi- 
tion  with  endogenous human  capital,  while  the reduced gain for younger 
workers appears to reflect the harm done to their lifetime optimization by my- 
opic expectations and the emerging postponement effect. 
Table 6.5 reports some of  the sensitivity analysis we have done with the 
model. The first three rows show changes with respect to which our central- 
case results on welfare gains from the various tax experiments are highly ro- 
bust. The first change raises the 8 parameter in the human capital production 
function to .75. By  itself, a move to 8 = .75 leads to a solution with almost 
no human capital investment taking place. Recall that we calibrated the base- 
case model by finding a value for the scale parameter, A,  in the human capital 
production function,  that  would  give human  capital investment plans that 
would generate an overall capital-labor ratio, and gross of tax rate of return r, 
equal to those in the base case of Davies, Hamilton, and Whalley (1989). We 
have recalibrated in the 8 = .75 run, choosing a new value of the parameter 
A to once again have r = .lo6  in the base case. The second and third changes 
also (necessarily) involve a recalibration of  the model. Here we find new Val- 
ues of A that generate initial steady states with the gross interest rate 2.0 per- 
centage points below and above the central-case value of 10.6%  alternatively. 
The last three rows of table 6.5 display more sensitivity, although none of 
these experiments disturbs the similarity of results with human capital endog- 
enous versus exogenous. Using a lower value of u  (4,  which many would 
now consider more “realistic” than u = 1, reduces the full dynamic welfare 
gains somewhat. Setting the Cobb-Douglas share parameter in the aggregate 
production function, y, equal to 0.6,  instead of the central-case value of 0.75, 
produces an approximate doubling in welfare gains. Behind this is a some- 
what greater increase in the capital-labor ratio under the various tax experi- 
ments tfian  observed in the central-case runs. With human capital endoge- 
nous, the capital-labor ratio rises 102% when the income tax is replaced by a 
wage tax and 138% under the consumption tax replacement. The correspond- 
ing figures in the central case were 92% and 112%. An interesting feature of 
the y = 0.6 results is that human wealth bulks significantly smaller as a pro- 
portion of  overall wealth. Now  human wealth in the initial steady state is 187  Taxes and Capital Formation 
Table 6.5  Dynamic Welfare Gains from Tax Experiments with Altered 
Parameter Values (% changes relative to base case) 
Replacing Income Tax by 
Wage Tax  Consumption Tax 
Human Capital  Human Capital  Human Capital  Human Capital 
Endogenous  Exogenous  Endogenous  Exogenous 
Central case  5.2 
Parameter changes: 
e = .75  5.3 
r = ,086  5.3 
r = ,126  5.5 
y = .6  9.8 
0 = .5  4.3 
Tax rates = 28  1.3 
~  ~~ 
5.7  6.2  6.3 
5.6  6.1  6.3 
5.3  6.3  6.3 
5.8  6.2  6.3 
10.2  12.2  12.4 
4.6  5.4  5.6 
1 .o  1.6  1.5 
Note: In the 0 = .75 run and the r = ,086 and ,126  runs, the human capital production function 
is recalibrated.  With 0 = .75 the parameter A is chosen so that initial r = ,106, as in the base 
case. The r = ,086 and r = .I26 runs necessitate  a new  choice  of  A  given  the  calibration 
procedure described in section 6.4 of the text. 
about 72% of total wealth, in contrast to the figure of 80% in the central-case 
runs. This may represent confirmation of the intuition about the impact of the 
relative size of the human capital stock (discussed in app. A) on the results of 
intertemporal tax analysis which we briefly outlined in section 6.2. 
Finally, the last row of table 6.5 indicates how our results would have dif- 
fered if we had assumed equal tax rates of 28% on labor and capital income in 
the base case. This run is motivated by recent U.S. tax reform. Reducing the 
assumed rate of tax on capital income from the 50% of the central case dra- 
matically reduces the percentage of welfare gains from wage or consumption 
tax experiments. However, it is interesting to note that even in this case the 
annual welfare gains from the move to wage or consumption taxes would 
equal about $63 billion and $77 billion, respectively, in current U.S. terms. 
(For comparison, in the second quarter of  1988 U.S. GDP was running at an 
annual rate of $4.8 trillion.) 
6.6  Conclusion 
This paper discusses how the analysis of the effects of taxes on capital for- 
mation is changed by the explicit incorporation of human capital. While there 
has been much discussion in recent public finance literature of  the effects of 
intertemporal tax distortions on capital formation and welfare, little of  this 
has explicitly incorporated human capital. In the paper we show how the im- 
pact effects of  incorporating human capital suggest important and neglected 
tax induced interasset effects and larger effects on savings (as conventionally 
measured), consistent with earlier partial equilibrium analysis of Driffill and 188  James Davies and John Whalley 
Rosen (1983). We also present a framework for dynamic long-run equilibrium 
analysis in the tradition of Summers (1980, 1981), but with endogenous hu- 
man capital formation. 
Using this framework, we perform numerical simulation analyses designed 
to explore how incorporating human capital affects the welfare analysis of tax 
distortions of  savings. For the numerical specification we use, estimates of 
intertemporal distorting costs of  taxes are little affected by including human 
capital, in contrast to the conclusion offered by Driffill and Rosen from their 
partial equilibrium analysis. While the impact effect of  removing these tax 
distortions is to increase savings by  more in the human capital endogenous 
case for a move from an income tax to a consumption or wage tax and to 
generate an additional interasset effect, in the long run the net of tax rate of 
return on nonhuman capital is largely unchanged because of  interasset substi- 
tution effects between human and nonhuman capital. As a result,  long-run 
welfare analysis produces values for the discounted present value of consump- 
tion plus change in the value of terminal capital, which are similar. Our paper 
therefore suggests that static partial equilibrium analysis focusing on how hu- 
man capital changes the analysis of tax distortions of savings can be mislead- 
ing when compared to full dynamic equilibrium analysis, which captures en- 
dogenous effects on interest rates through interasset substitution effects. 
These findings must, however, be qualified by the fact that some potentially 
important features of human capital formation and its tax treatment are ne- 
glected in our analysis. Our simulation model has exogenous leisure and does 
not incorporate liquidity constraints, progressivity in the income tax, or job- 
specific human capital. We  have also not modeled rationing of access to edu- 
cational institutions, and the lump-sum effects that taxes on the associated 
pure rents would create.  Intergenerational links within the family that may 
affect human capital formation are also not incorporated. A further qualifica- 
tion is that, as in all such work, our results are contingent on specific func- 
tional forms and parameter values. Work with more general production func- 
tions for both aggregate output and human capital is an important avenue for 
future research. Thus, although we feel that our paper takes an important step 
in clarifying the impact of incorporating human capital in  life-cycle simula- 
tions of  tax effects in dynamic equilibrium, it should be regarded as a first 
foray in this area. 
Appendix 
Estimates of the Size of the Human Capital Stock 
There are two approaches commonly used to measure the stock of  human 
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past investments of time to measure the value of the current stock of human 
capital. The other calculates the present value of  the stream of future incre- 
mental earnings attributable to human capital. In principle, as we argue below, 
the latter research (used, e.g., by Bowman 1974) is superior. 
If the first approach is used, results are sensitive to a number of differences 
in  procedure. These include the calculation of  a depreciation factor for in- 
vested funds and the classification of expenditures that are allocated to human 
capital accumulation. Examples of papers that use this approach are Kendrick 
(1976) and Schultz (1960). 
To  us, the second approach seems analytically superior. In the absence of 
an explicit market, the value of human capital must equal the discounted pres- 
ent value of the earnings stream that it generates. In general, this is likely to 
differ from the accumulated cost of inputs into human capital investment be- 
cause the rate  of  return on inframarginal investments exceeds the discount 
rate. 
A series of factors also affects estimates generated by the second approach, 
however. These include the method used to approximate the profile of future 
earnings for workers, the choice of discount rate used to compute the present 
value of  earnings streams, and the choice of  the wage rate of  “nonimproved 
labor.” An attractive feature of work in this group of studies, however, is that 
calculations can be related to explicit models of the human capital accumula- 
tion process. For example, previous work on earnings functions has been used 
to develop models explaining earnings that can then be estimated and subse- 
quently simulated to produce a sequence of future earning returns to workers 
of different type. Incremental earnings returns can then be discounted back to 
compute the net present value. Examples of papers that use this approach are 
Graham and Webb (1979) and Kroch and Sjoblom (1986). 
The earliest  attempt to  value the  stock of  human  capital  is  by  Schultz 
(1960).  Schultz’s motivation for calculating the  size of  the human  capital 
stock was to evaluate the contribution of education to economic growth. He 
wished to be able to compare the value of  investments in human and nonhu- 
man capital, the stocks of human and physical capital, and the relative rates 
of return to these two investment vehicles. 
Schultz calculated the human capital stock by  cumulating educational ex- 
penditures. Direct costs and forgone earnings vary between elementary, sec- 
ondary, and higher education. Forgone earnings were calculated by determin- 
ing the number of weeks per year that a student is voluntarily out of the labor 
market, and multiplying this by the current average weekly wage in manufac- 
turing (forgone earnings are typically at least 50% of the costs of education). 
Schultz determined the educational capital stock by  summing together the 
product of total numbers of years of each type of education and its estimated 
cost. Schultz calculated that in 1957 the educational capital stock for the labor 
force aged over 14 was approximately 30% of the total capital stock; a rela- 
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Kendrick (1976) also provided estimates of capital investment and cumu- 
lated stocks for various types of capital, including human capital. Human cap- 
ital was separated into two categories: tangible and intangible human wealth. 
The former includes costs such as “rearing costs” incurred in raising children 
to working age (14 years). Only direct costs (i.e., not the opportunity cost of 
parent’s time) is included. Intangible investments include expenditure on edu- 
cation, employee training, medical, health, safety, and mobility. Of the cate- 
gories of  human wealth considered by  Kendrick, expenditures on education 
and employee training are of a discretionary nature and subject to tax effects. 
Various  sources, such as surveys and published data, were used by  Ken- 
drick to determine expenditures, and deflators were obtained to derive real 
expenditure. For educational expenditures, the procedure was to first estimate 
the average real expenditures per head by single age groups up to age 95, then 
cumulate per capita lifetime expenditures for each cohort for each year cov- 
ered in the calculation. This is then multiplied by  the number of persons in 
each age group each year and summed across age groups. A depreciation ad- 
justment was applied to education investments beginning at age 28. 
While it is not possible to compare exactly the calculations of Kendrick and 
Schultz, the estimates appear to be close since, according to Kendrick, the 
ratio of human to total wealth is approximately 28% in 1957. 
Unlike the calculations of Kendrick and Schultz, Graham and Webb (1979) 
estimate the size of  the stock of human wealth by  capitalizing the flow  of 
returns to human capital. The use of this approach is motivated by the obser- 
vation that the services of human capital are priced in labor markets, in con- 
trast to the services of physical capital goods. 
The basis for their calculation is 1970 Public Use Survey data, collected 
from detailed census questionnaires. Their methodology involves assuming 
that all agents in the same age cohort with the same number of years of edu- 
cation are the same. Agents are assumed to engage in no postschool invest- 
ment in human capital. To calculate lifetime expected earnings, a secular earn- 
ings growth rate is applied to earnings of workers currently possessing t years 
of  schooling. This means that a younger person will have a higher earnings 
profile than an older person with the same level of education. Their earnings 
streams are based on expected earnings, which are weighted by probabilities 
of being alive at various ages derived from life tables. Present values of earn- 
ings for a representative agent of  alternative ages and with various years of 
schooling are calculated. These are then multiplied by the number of  agents 
and then summed over all values of age and schooling to find the aggregate 
human capital stock. 
Graham and Webb present numerous graphs displaying the behavior of the 
human capital stock over time. The pattern of lifetime human wealth increases 
initially, followed by  a decline to zero at retirement. The peak in the wealth 
series generally occurs at around age 40. The point at which depreciation be- 
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The size of  the males-only capital stock is calculated by  the authors for 
1969, using a discount rate of 7.5%. Their estimates of $7.2 trillion compare 
to Kendrick’s total nonhuman capital stock figure of $3.7 trillion. A 20% dis- 
count rate, however, lowers the figure to $2.9 trillion. Using the $7.2 trillion 
figure for human capital means that their estimate of the male human capital 
stock would be roughly twice the nonhuman capital stock reported by Ken- 
drick. 
A further paper by  Kroch  and Sjoblom (1986) also uses a present dis- 
counted earnings approach similar to that employed by  Graham and Webb. 
Under their approach, the stream of earnings for a representative agent with 
given characteristics is constructed by first fitting an earnings function model 
of the type suggested by Mincer (1974) to longitudinal earnings data. Their 
earnings function depends on years of schooling, time worked, experience, 
vintage effects for persons, and various interaction terms (e.g., the product of 
experience and schooling, to allow for different effects of  experience given 
different levels of schooling). This earnings function is then simulated to pro- 
duce earnings profiles for given types of individuals. The resulting earnings 
streams provide a measure of returns to human capital, and these can then be 
aggregated over all individuals. An  attractive feature of  this work  is that it 
focuses on schooling wealth, that is, the capitalized value of  improvements 
made to labor. A separate estimate is reported for human wealth, which is 
schooling wealth plus the present value of  the return to unimproved labour 
(the wage with zero years of schooling). 
Using a discount rate of 4%, the authors report values of  schooling wealth 
that are dramatically larger than the educational wealth estimates of Kendrick 
and Schultz. For 1980, the stock of  human wealth is calculated to be $26.5 
trillion, while schooling wealth is $18 trillion. For comparison, the Federal 
Reserve Board measure of  the aggregate value of  real capital was  approxi- 
mately $9.6 trillion. They suggest the gap between these measures has wid- 
ened markedly since the early 1970s. 
Finally, Jorgenson and Pachon (1983) obtain much higher values for the 
human capital stock by making an allowance for the value of home produc- 
tion. Their conclusion is that human capital may represent as much as 96% of 
the total capital stock of the United States. While one may wish to discount 
such a high figure, it is nonetheless clear that one underestimates considerably 
the value of  the flow  of  services produced by  human capital if  one ignores 
household outputs. 
The literature, therefore, exhibits considerable variability as to estimates of 
the value of  the human capital stock. The divergence in results between the 
first approach (cumulating costs of  investment) and the second (discounting 
future earnings) is explicable in terms of  the latter capturing the impact of 
high inframarginal returns to human capital investment. We prefer the second 
approach on theoretical grounds, and therefore conclude that the literature 
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than the physical capital stock. Some might feel that this is evident from the 
national accounts, which show that the return to human capital in the form of 
earnings is about three times capital income. The issue, however, is how much 
of the return to labor one attributes as a return to human capital. 
Notes 
1. A review of the literature should also mention Lord (1989), which uses a model 
in many ways similar to ours. Lord’s paper came to our attention after this paper was 
completed. While our analysis focuses on the impact of income taxes relative to wage 
or consumption taxes, Lord is concerned only with the differences between wage and 
consumption taxes. Thus his paper is complementary to ours. 
2.  There has been considerable work, largely by Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes, on 
the importance of intergenerational links in human capital formation. Although parents 
cannot bequeath their human capital, they typically find it efficient to achieve much, if 
not all, of their desired transfers to offspring via investment in the child’s human capi- 
tal. In this context, estate and gift taxes, in addition to income taxes, can distort human 
capital investment. Further differences vis h vis the pure life-cycle model considered 
in this paper arise if  capital market imperfections are taken into account. See Becker 
and Tomes (1986), Davies (1986), and Davies and St-Hilaire (1987). 
3.  See the  original  discussion  in  Becker  (1975,  26-37),  as well  as Hashimoto 
(1981) and Carmichael(l983) for a more recent treatment. 
4. Signaling models have been leant some attraction by  the frequent observation 
that much formal education does not impart job-relevant skills. However, models of 
investment in person-specific information provide an alternative, and productive, ex- 
planation of the earnings payoff to forms of education that do not provide skills (see 
MacDonald  1980; and Davies and MacDonald  1984). The accumulation of informa- 
tion in these models is in fact a form of human capital investment. 
5. In human capital theory  an important distinction is made between “gross” or 
“potential” earnings, which represent the maximum that could be earned, holding lei- 
sure constant, and “net” earnings,  which correspond to the observed labor income. 
(The difference between potential and net earnings represents the income forgone for 
the sake of human capital formation.) Taxes are, of course, levied on net earnings, that 
is, the portion of  full labor income that is currently available for consumption.  The 
treatment therefore corresponds to that given to a “qualified” or “registered” asset in 
the consumption tax literature (see U.S. Treasury 1977). 
6.  The diminishing rate of  return to investment in human capital here is due solely 
to diminishing productivity of time and other inputs in human capital production. In an 
N-period model (Ben-Porath 1967) there will usually also be a decline in the marginal 
rate of return to a given amount of human capital investment as the individual ages, 
due to the ever-receding remaining length of the working life. 
7.  There has  recently  been considerable  interest  in the  impact of  liquidity  con- 
straints in intertemporal tax analysis (see Hubbard and Judd 1986; and Browning and 
Burbidge 1988). It would clearly be very simple to address the implications in figures 
6.1 and 6.2. One important implication is that, to the extent that such a borrowing 
constraint is effective, the distorting effects on human capital investment of interest 
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8. This is an interesting point since, as outlined in app. A, recent estimates of the 
value of the human capital stock suggest that it exceeds that of  the physical capital 
stock by a ratio of about three to one. 
9.  Partial equilibrium welfare calculations can be generated as a by-product of the 
full dynamic simulations we perform later in the paper. As discussed below, the results 
of these calculations are not inconsistent with the DR partial equilibrium results. 
10.  Also, as pointed out by Sherwin Rosen in his comments on this paper, to the 
extent that human capital  increases productivity in nonmarket activities (“leisure”), 
which produce untaxed income in kind, any subsidy to schooling, implicit or other- 
wise, tends to encourage overinvestment in human capital. 
11.  A still more general model would incorporate married couples, differentiating 
between the labor supplied by, and leisure consumed by, the two spouses. There are of 
course many possible tax effects on the division of labor between husbands and wives. 
Also, men and women still exhibit marked differences in patterns of human capital 
investment.  It would be  interesting to consider the impacts of alternative forms of 
taxation on these patterns, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
12.  Recently, a variety of  alternative explanations for personal wage growth over 
the life-cycle have emerged. Lazear (1979) has suggested, for example, that positively 
sloped age-earnings profiles would be observed even if workers’ marginal productivity 
did not vary over the life-cycle in an equilibrium where an incentive mechanism was 
required to discourage  shirking.  More recent  literature confirms that a rising  wage 
profile may be an important element in such equilibrium mechanisms (see, e.g., Kuhn 
1986). To  the extent that such factors, rather than human capital investment, explain 
the shape of  the age-earnings profile, interest income taxes might have quite different 
effects on age-earnings  profiles than they  do here,  with differing consequences  for 
saving. 
13. Along a balanced growth path each generation makes the same investment in 
human capital and provides the same labor supply. Aggregate labour supply, Hy,  there- 
fore grows at the rate n. Given our specification of (l), such an outcome is only pos- 
sible with Cobb-Douglas preferences if g >  0. Otherwise succeeding cohorts will have 
differing labor-supply  plans.  In order to use  a more general form of  (l), AKS set 
14.  Although this specification is widely used in the literature, the implied age pro- 
file of consumption departs markedly from what is observed. As is well known, actual 
age profiles of consumption are hump shaped. The implications for intertemporal tax 
analysis are discussed in Davies (1988) and Browning and Burbidge (1988). 
15. Under Ben-Porath neutrality, an increase in H, raises the productivity of time in 
the labor market and in the production of human capital equiproportionally. 
16.  In fact, (15) is the basic functional form estimated by Heckman (1975), whose 
results reject  the hypothesis that H, should appear in  (14).  (In contrast,  some other 
contributions to the empirical literature, e.g., Haley 1976, adopt [14“] as a maintained 
hypothesis .) 
17.  In a Summers-type model, g governs the age profile of earnings, which is of 
course exponential, as well as secular wage growth. Investment in human capital in- 
creases the steepness of the age profile of  earnings. With any “reasonable” amount of 
such investment, g = .02 would give an extremely steep earnings trajectory, making 
it impossible to generate sufficient aggregate  saving to get the desired  steady-state 
stock of physical capital, given Summers’s values for the taste parameters. 
18.  Our choices of 6 and 8  are not inconsistent with available empirical evidence 
(which is, however, limited). Estimates of 6 vary widely, from about 0.2% (Heckman 
1975), to 1.2% (Mincer 1974), to 37~4%  (Haley 1976). Heckman’s (1975) estimate 
of 8  was 0.67. 
19. This assumption turns out to produce only a small deviation in the results from 
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those  obtained  with  Summers’s approach.  Each  individual expects (correctly)  that 
transfers will grow at the rate g in future. If this rate corresponded to the desired growth 
rate of consumption, paying out the revenues as lump-sum transfers unrelated to age 
would produce no change in saving (as compared to not paying any transfers). In fact, 
in the runs reported here the desired growth rate of  consumption exceeds g, so that 
paying out transfers in this way  generates some additional saving. The effect on the 
results is not marked, however. 
20.  The postponement effect was identified by Summers (1981, 539). With an ex- 
ogenously growing revenue requirement and year-by-year budget balance, any given 
cohort will bear a lower present value of lifetime taxes the later it tends to pay its taxes 
in the life-cycle. Here, when human capital is endogenous the new steady state under 
the wage tax features somewhat reduced human capital investment. This tilts the age 
profile of earnings toward the present, resulting in earlier payment of taxes over the 
life-cycle under a wage tax (but not under a consumption tax). This appears to explain 
the difference here in steady-state welfare gains with exogenous vs. endogenous hu- 
man capital in the wage tax experiment. 
21.  That the wage and consumption tax experiments produce slightly better results 
here in transition when human capital is exogenous may partly reflect the impact of 
myopic expectations. As shown in tables 6.3 and 6.4, there is a rapid decline in the 
rate of return on physical capital in the first 10-20  years of transition.  Both human 
capital investment and saving decisions made in the earliest transition years under the 
expectation of continued high interest rates turn out ex post to have been quite wrong. 
In particular it turns out not to have been a good idea to largely cease all human capital 
investment, as occurs in the first few transition years with human capital endogenous. 
If unchanged human capital investment is closer to the perfect foresight policy in these 
years,  one would expect that welfare in transition would be higher with exogenous 
rather than endogenous human capital, which is what we obtain. 
22.  The levels of the partial equilibrium gains are very sensitive to the parameteri- 
zation of  the utility  function.  In contrast,  the exogenous-endogenous  differential in 
EVs is primarily determined by  the shape of  the human capital production function. 
This is because the only difference between the two cases in partial equilibrium analy- 
sis is that the distortion in human capital investment is removed by wage or consump- 
tion taxes if human capital is endogenous, but not if  it is exogenous. The severity of 
the distortion does not depend on preferences, since the human capital plan here is 
wealth maximizing. 
23.  Since we have set the depreciation rate of human capital at 1  %, this 0.7%  deple- 
tion is close to the maximum possible in a single year and reflects a radical short-run 
change in the allocation of time. There is almost a complete collapse of training activ- 
ity in the impact year, and it takes several periods before training returns to levels close 
to those of the base-case steady state. An immediate result of the decline in training 
time is a substantial increase in labor supply. This is the sole reason for the 8.1% first- 
period decline in the capital-labor ratio under both wage and consumption tax experi- 
ments. 
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COIllmeIlt  Sherwin Rosen 
This is an excellent paper. It is the most complete analysis available on how 
human capital considerations affect income and expenditure tax distortions. 
The principal finding that human capital does not affect welfare calculations 
very much is compelling and consistent with what is known about this prob- 
lem from a partial equilibrium perspective. 
The most important fact about tax distortions on human capital investment 
is that most investment costs consist of forgone earnings and are fully “ex- 
pensed” for tax purposes (Becker 1975). Accelerated depreciation of human 
capital eliminates most direct tax distortions. The easiest way to see this is in 
a school-stopping  model. A person with labor-market experience  x has a gross 
of  tax earning stream of y(x, S) upon completing S  years of school, with y 
increasing S.  For an income tax at rate t and out-of-pocket (tuition, books) 
flow expense c(S), human wealth is 
fs 
because c(S)  is not tax deductible. Thus S  is chosen to maximize W(S):  this 
occurs where the marginal after-tax internal rate of return equals the after-tax 
interest rate. Now  if  c(S)  is small then (1 -t)  multiplies both marginal costs 
and marginal returns and cancels out. Progressive taxation is necessary to get 
some effect. If  c(S) is not small, then even proportionate taxation discourages 
investment. It is generally thought that forgone earnings account for three- 
fourths of total school expenditure. Rising costs of college tuition and related 
expenses in the past decade may have decreased the proportion recently, but 
probably not by much. There is also evidence that the return to schooling is 
discontinuous in degree attainment. This “sheepskin effect” gives an extra 
return for actually completing a degree. Both factors suggest that proportional 
income taxation has little direct effect on schooling choices. 
The authors concentrate on on-the-job training and do not consider school 
investments. Taxes could affect human capital investment indirectly by affect- 
ing the composition, stability, and division of labor within families and the 
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labor-force participation of women. Youth dependency amounts to something 
like one-fourth to one-third of  one's life and a nontrivial fraction of  human 
capital investment takes place in the home in those years. Household produc- 
tion is tax exempt and is encouraged by both income and expenditure taxa- 
tion, but this never gets counted in the calculations. Of course marital insta- 
bility, declining fertility, and increasing labor-force participation of  women 
have all affected human capital formation in recent decades, but few of these 
large social changes are thought to be closely associated with income or ex- 
penditure tax policy. 
Davies and Whalley 's  simulations are based on the standard utilitarian cal- 
culus without explicit intergenerational linkages in preferences. Their analy- 
sis can be simplified by solving the time allocation variable s  out of the general 
model and specifying earnings as a function of skills, learning, and work time 
instead. Thus write y  = g(H, H,  L),  where H  is human capital stock and H is 
investment, with g, > 0, g, < 0, and g, <  0. If A is financial assets, r'the rate 
of interest, t the rate of income taxation, and t*  the rate of  expenditure taxa- 
tion, then the flow constraint on the intertemporal problem amounts to 
A = (1  -t)[rA + g(H, H, L)] -  C/(1 -t*), 
assuming that all human capital investments are fully expensed for tax pur- 
poses. 
Adding constraint (2) to their preference structure and examining the Euler 
equations shows the following: 
(i) Both t and t*  enter the marginal condition for leisure in the same way 
and have identical distortions on labor supply. 
(ii) The expenditure tax t*  multiplies both sides of the intertemporal con- 
sumption decision and cancels out. It is nondistorting on saving. The income 
tax does not factor out and has a distorting effect on saving and nonhuman 
investment. 
(iii) Both  t and t*  drop out of  the marginal condition for human capital 
investment and have no direct effects. There is an indirect effect, because in- 
come taxes distort the valuation of future money relative to present money and 
taxes affect labor supply decisions. Both enter the human capital investment 
decision. 
The main point is that introducing human capital does not add any direct 
distortions. All of the calculations depend on indirect effects and these turn 
out to be small. In fact introducing a substitute for nonhuman capital makes 
things better from the welfare point of view. In the simulations reported in the 
paper, the labor margin is suppressed and hours are fixed. Allowing hours to 
adjust would increase the calculated distortion, but the effect would be small 
for men because their compensated labor-supply elasticity is small. Expand- 
ing the model to include women would be more interesting because their wage 
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pends on the degree of substitution between market and nonmarket produc- 
tion, and little is known about that. 
The simulations are built upon the important unstated assumption that hu- 
man capital has no value outside of the market sector. Suppose the opposite, 
that human capital has as much value in nonmarket production as in market 
production. Then even hours worked in the market do not directly affect the 
return on human  capital.  However, since human capital used  in household 
production is not taxed,  both income and consumption taxes encourage its 
utilization there and this stimulates excess investment from the social point of 
view. In this case there is a direct distortion on the human capital margin and 
eliminating another investment distortion through consumption over income 
taxation might have much larger welfare effects than are calculated here. 
Davies  and  Whalley  point  out  that  their  analysis only  covers worker- 
financed  investments.  However,  firm-financed  investments are  similar be- 
cause most firm-specific human capital investment costs are wage payments 
and these are fully expensed in tax accounting of firms: accelerated deprecia- 
tion of human capital applies to firms as well as individuals, and most of what 
remains are only indirect effects. 
While it probably does not affect the central conclusion, there is a concep- 
tual objection to the form of the investment production function chosen for 
analysis that is obscured by  the way  in which the model is presented. The 
slope -  dy/dH = -  g, in the earnings function defined above is the marginal 
cost of investment. On their assumption that the investment production func- 
tion only depends on s, direct calculation reveals that the marginal cost of 
investing is increasing in H.  This implies that more able people whose endow- 
ments of capital are larger invest less than less able people; and that aggregate 
investment should fall over time, as labor augmenting technical change in- 
creases effective endowments. Neither is true.  Specifying marginal cost as 
decreasing in embodied knowledge is preferable on these grounds. Models 
with that kind of increasing return do exist (Rosen 1976) and could be worked 
into the analysis with no greater effort than the form now used. Whatever that 
may be, the analysis makes no reference to changes over time in the social 
knowledge available for people to invest in, except insofar as it appears in 
exogenous technical change. This follows the human capital literature, but 
who is so sure that tax treatments of human capital do not have anything to do 
with the invention of new knowledge? 
Finally, we have here another all-too-familiar instance where the pure eco- 
nomic case for expenditure taxation is firmly established, but where it is not 
much used. In this sense income taxation is related to such policies as tariffs 
and  quotas,  minimum wages,  rent controls  and  price supports-all  cases 
where economists’ overwhelming consensus is hardly reflected in actual pub- 
lic policy. Could it be that political considerations enter the determination of 
which instruments are used? Income taxes seem to have agency-like virtues 200  James Davies and John Whalley 
of clarifying the amounts actually paid by taxpayers and thereby serve as some 
limit, however small, to the size of the public sector. Value-added taxes are 
hard to count and do not have these virtues. 
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